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Abstract 
 
In 1994 ten Belgian soldiers were murdered during the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda. 
Shortly thereafter Belgium withdrew its soldiers from the peacekeeping mission (Van der Lijn 
& Dundon, 2014) as the Belgian government did not want to risk any further casualties
2
 (Des 
Forges, 1999). This case provides anecdotal evidence for the assumption that politicians are 
susceptible to the impact of casualties. Although we assume that political leaders make cost-
benefit decisions, it could be argued that this decision was rather emotional than rational and 
that decisions may be influenced by a form of casualty aversion. The link between casualties, 
public opinion and foreign policy has been studied extensively. A reduced public support for 
participation in military missions caused by military casualties has been labelled as ‘the body 
bag syndrome’ or ‘casualties hypothesis’. Although empirical studies do not seem to support 
the hypothesis (Kull, 1995; Burk, 1999; Everts, 2001), its (alleged) existence does seem to 
influence foreign policy decisions (Kull & Ramsay, 2001). As policymakers believe in the 
body bag syndrome, they may adapt their foreign policy accordingly, leading to reduced 
military participation (Feaver & Gelpi, 2005).  
 
This concern constitutes the starting point for our research. Our goal is to study the impact 
that casualties have on the probability of participation and size of the contribution. If there is 
no decline in participation or the size of the contribution when casualties are incurred during 
previous periods, this self-fulfilling expectation among politicians is unlikely to exist. A 
dataset was constructed containing 27 NATO countries
3
. We set up a dyad structure of NATO 
countries deploying to conflict locations. Based on the determinants of troop contribution 
provided in the literature (Bove and Elia, 2011), we extend the model to casualties incurred 
during previous periods in order to assess whether or not they will actually lead to reduced 
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 Casualties and fatalities are often used together in literature. In this paper we will use casualties meaning deaths 
during the military missions irrespective of the cause. 
3
 Iceland was left out of the dataset, as the country has no active military deployments. 
participation or a declining size of contributions. The model consists of both conflict related 
variables and donor characteristics.  Conflict characteristics are the intensity of the conflict 
and the amount internally displaced people. Distance to the conflict, the amount of 
simultaneous peacekeeping missions and real GDP per capita are, among others, considered 
the donor characteristics.  
 
As the decision on whether or not to participate precedes the decision on the amount of troops 
to send (Bove and Elia, 2011), a distinction can be made between both. These were tested 
separately as participation is a dichotomous variable and the size of contribution is a 
continuous variable. The participation hypothesis is tested through a probit regression. The 
Classical Linear Regression Model is used to test for the size of contribution. Working with 
panel data, we have to account for heterogeneity among the different countries. A random 
effects model was introduced and the Mundlak (1978) correction is applied. To avoid 
multicollinearity problems, covariates with a high correlation were not simultaneously added 
to the model. By consequence, the deaths of the previous year and two years preceding the 
decision were not added simultaneously. To account for the effect of the deaths of two years 
before the decision to participate, the sum was taken into account. 
 
During the research, we noticed that results were driven by two missions: International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and Multi-National Force (MNF) in Iraq. 
Therefore, we performed tests including and excluding these missions. Depending on whether 
or not the ISAF and MNF mission are included in the dataset, different conclusions can be 
drawn. When excluding the missions, NATO countries did not reduce their participation. In 
fact, mounting casualties are slightly increasing chances of participation, although this was 
only weakly significant. When including the missions in the regression, previous year 
casualties did not affect participation results, although casualties of two antecedent years 
caused for a reduction in participation probability. These tests were combined with some 
robustness tests from which interesting conclusions could be drawn. First, conflict related 
variables were determining participation more than the characteristics of NATO countries. 
Furthermore, when excluding the NATO organised missions, there seems to be a threshold for 
participating in peacekeeping missions as countries have limited capacity. This threshold is 
not present when specific NATO missions are included. This could imply that a threshold 
exists when deciding to participate in peacekeeping missions for organisations other than 
regional organisations, as NATO countries will be most likely to participate in NATO 
missions. 
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